Tommaso Reggiani is currently research associate at Masaryk University (Brno - Czech Republic),
Dept. of Public Economics & MUEEL lab.

He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Bologna.
He held research positions at the Toulouse School of Economics and University of Cologne.
His research interests include behavioral labor economics, economics of education, experimental economics
as well as microeconometrics.

Tommaso joined IZA as a Research Affiliate in April 2010 and became a Research Fellow in July 2017.



IZA Discussion Paper No. 11290

Social media have been credited with the potential of reinvigorating trust by offering new opportunities for social and political participation. This view has been recently challenged by the rising phenomenon of online incivility, which has made the environment of social networking sites hostile to many users. We conduct a novel...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 10710
revised version published in: International Tax and Public Finance, December 2017, 24(6): 1026-1049 [ DOI: 10.1007/s10797-017-9474-z ]

In this paper we study by means of a framed field experiment on a representative sample of the population the effect on people's charitable giving of three, substantial and procedural, elements: information provision, belief elicitation and threshold on distribution. We frame this investigation within the 5X1000 tax scheme, a mechanism...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 10189

We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests in a trust game experiment. We vary systematically the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of level of each request and in terms of sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8534
revised version published in: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Oct. 2017, 12(3): 595-611 [ DOI: 10.1007/s11403-016-0177-9 ]

This paper investigates the effect of different communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping in a helping situation. Four treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to solicit unincentivized cooperation, i.e., face-to-face, phone call and two different sorts of computer-mediated communication. The less anonymous (face-to-face, phone) the interpersonal interaction...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6254
revised version "Loss Averse Agents and Lenient Supervisors in Performance Appraisal " pubished in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, November 2016, 131(A): 183–197 [ DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.022 ]

In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent's effort; ii) aims at inducing the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, deserving agents that have exerted...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5844
revised version "Cooperation or Competition? A Field Experiment on Non-Monetary Learning Incentives" published in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2015, 15 (4), 1753-1792 [ DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2014-0109 ]

This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students,...