Carlos Carrillo-Tudela

Research Fellow

University of Essex

Carlos Carrillo-Tudela is a Reader (Associate Professor) in Economics at the University of Essex, UK. He received his PhD and MSc in economics in 2006 from the same university. During his graduate studies he spent part of 2005 as a visiting scholar at the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. After graduating he was a Lecturer in Economics at the University of Leicester, UK (2006-2010) and University of Essex, UK (2010-2011).

His main research interests include search and matching theory and the macroeconomics of labour markets. Currently his research focuses on wage inequality and the dynamics of wages. For his paper "An equilibrium search model with optimal wage-experience contracts", he was awarded a Young Economist Award of the European Economic Association in 2005.

He joined IZA as a Research Fellow in September 2008.



IZA Discussion Paper No. 9525
Labour Economics (2017): forthcoming

This paper proposes a simple general equilibrium model with labour market frictions and an imperfect financial market. The aim of the paper is to analyse the transitional dynamics of unemployment and vacancies when financial constraints are in place. We model the financial sector as a monopolistically competitive banking sector that...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9367

We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different abilities, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently strong information frictions,...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9366

The focus of this chapter is to consider new developments in the search and matching literature where wages, quit turnover and unemployment are endogenously determined in economies with aggregate shocks. The aim of the discussion is not only to highlight possible market failures but also to explain how on-the-job search...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8430

Using quarterly data for the U.K. from 1993 through 2012, we document that in economic downturns a smaller fraction of unemployed workers change their career when starting a new job. Moreover, the proportion of total hires that involves a career change for the worker also drops in recessions. Together with...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7124
revised version available here

We build an analytically and computationally tractable stochastic equilibrium model of unemployment in heterogeneous labor markets. Facing search frictions within markets and reallocation frictions between markets, workers endogenously separate from employment and endogenously reallocate between markets, in response to changing aggregate and local conditions. Empirically, using the 1986-2008 SIPP panels,...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6949

The objective of this paper is to construct and quantitatively assess an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search and general human capital accumulation. In the model workers enter the labour market with different abilities and firms differ in their productivities. Wages are dispersed because of search frictions and workers' productivity...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6366

We construct a simple equilibrium search model in which workers accumulate information about previously met employment contacts. We term the latter search capital. Here search capital (partially) insures workers against adverse shocks. The model provides a theory of job-to-job transitions that are associated with voluntary or involuntary mobility and with...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5936

We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium,...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4319
published in: International Economic Review, 2011, 52 (3), 639 - 655

This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4215
published in: International Economic Review, 2011, 52 (3), 657 - 677

We analyse an equilibrium labour market with on-the-job search and experience effects (where workers learn-by-doing). The analysis yields a standard Mincer wage equation with worker fixed effects and endogenously determined firm fixed effects. It shows that learning-by-doing increases equilibrium wage dispersion consistent with the data. Equilibrium sorting - where over...