• COVID-19 Research
  • IZA Newsroom
  • Login
  • DE
  • About
    Overview Mission and Vision Areas of Expertise Organization History Jobs CSR
  • Research
    Overview Research Teams Network Projects Awards Research Data Center (IDSC)
  • Publications
    Overview Discussion Papers Journals Research in Labor Economics World of Labor Policy Papers Standpunkte Research Reports Books
  • Events
    Overview Events Calendar Research Seminars Conferences and Workshops IZA Summer School
  • People
    Overview Local Team Global Network Guest Researchers Alumni

IZA Discussion Papers

  • Home
  • Publications
  • IZA Discussion Papers

The IZA Discussion Paper Series (ISSN: 2365-9793) disseminates high-quality research by IZA network members to the scientific community and the interested public worldwide before they are later published in academic journals. Comprising over 13,000 papers, IZA's publication flagship is the most influential working paper series in labor economics. 

Read our new IZA Discussion Papers on COVID-19.

Submission guidelines for authors

Subscribe to new paper alerts

Search by:

Please provide a valid Search.
Search tips
Wildcard

The character * can be used as a wildcard. For example: *berg

Filter

Type
Type
38 IZA Discussion Papers
IZA Discussion Paper No. 13924
Strategic Compromise, Policy Bundling and Interest Group Power
Luna Bellani, Vigile Marie Fabella, Francesco Scervini
IZA Discussion Paper No. 12215
Self-Confidence and Reactions to Subjective Performance Evaluations
Charles Bellemare, Alexander Sebald
IZA Discussion Paper No. 11289
Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation
Matthias Kräkel
IZA Discussion Paper No. 10520
Pledging, Praising and Shaming: Experimental Labour Markets in Ghana
Elwyn Davies, Marcel Fafchamps
IZA Discussion Paper No. 10257
Free-Riding and Knowledge Spillovers in Teams: The Role of Social Ties
Maria De Paola, Francesca Gioia, Vincenzo Scoppa
published in: European Economic Review, 2019, 112, 74-90.
IZA Discussion Paper No. 9578
Are Starting Wages Reduced by an Insurance Premium for Preventing Wage Decline? Testing the Prediction of Harris and Holmstrom (1982)
Joop Hartog, Pedro Raposo
forthcoming in Labour Economics
IZA Discussion Paper No. 8971
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening
IZA Discussion Paper No. 8704
Strategic Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Experiments
Nisvan Erkal, Steven Y. Wu, Brian E. Roe
IZA Discussion Paper No. 8404
Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell, Tom Wilkening
IZA Discussion Paper No. 8288
Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information
Sheng Bi, François Langot
IZA Discussion Paper No. 7758
Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility
William Fuchs
IZA Discussion Paper No. 7477
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Anastasia Danilov, Dirk Sliwka
Revised version forthcoming in Management Science
IZA Discussion Paper No. 7321
Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Roland Benabou, Jean Tirole
IZA Discussion Paper No. 7271
Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Matthias Kräkel
IZA Discussion Paper No. 7029
Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt
IZA Discussion Paper No. 6530
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence
Stéphane R. Robin, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Marie Claire Villeval
revised version published in: European Economic Review, 2014, 66, 16-38.
IZA Discussion Paper No. 6304
Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Roman M. Sheremeta, Steven Y. Wu
IZA Discussion Paper No. 6095
How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart, Christian Zehnder
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5325
Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
Wendelin Schnedler
improved version is available here
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5027
Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave
Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider
revised version published as 'Optimal Incentive Contracts for Knowledge Workers' in: European Economic Review, 2014, 67, 82-106
Type
Display
20 50 100
Type
  • 1
  • 2
Imprint
Privacy Policy
Code of Conduct
Status
© 2021 Deutsche Post STIFTUNG
We use Google Analytics in compliance with German Data Protection Law. The site gathers data for the sole purpose of improving its services. You're able to decline now or later. By using our services, you agree to our use of cookies. You'll find more information here.
Details
Accept
DE