Gerd Muehlheusser studied Economics at the University of Frankfurt, where he received a degree as Diplom-Volkswirt in 1998. From 1998 to 2002 he was a member of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics and the European Doctoral Programme (EDP), of which he spent the second year at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He completed his PhD in 2002. From October 2002 until May 2003, he was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

Since Sepetmber 2011 he is Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He was previously Associate Professor at the University of Bielefeld, and Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics of the University of Bern, Switzerland. His research interests include industrial organization, organizational economics, law & economics, contracts and environmental economics.

He joined IZA as a Research Affiliate in November 2001 and became a Research Fellow in December 2003.



IZA Discussion Paper No. 10607

Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised worries about fraudulent claims by low-productivity employees. We study these...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8560
forthcoming in: Journal of Sports Economics, 2017

We study the impact of managers on the success of professional soccer teams using data from the German "Bundesliga". We evaluate the performance impact of individual managers by estimating regression models that include both team and manager fixed effects, where we are exploiting the high turnover of managers between teams...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8443
revised version published in: Economics Letters, 2015, 128, 25-29

Extending the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), we compare gender effects with respect to unethical behavior by individuals and by two-person groups. In contrast to individual decisions, gender matters strongly under group decisions. We find more lying in male groups and mixed groups than in female groups.

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6884
forthcoming in: Economic Inquiry [Online First]

When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates, these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents. As a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change –...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6478
published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, 116, 387–406

In contexts such as education and sports, skill-accumulation of individuals over time crucially depends on the amount of training they receive, which is often allocated on the basis of repeated selection. We analyze optimal selection policies in a model of endogenous skill formation where, apart from their ability to transform...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5027
revised version published as 'Optimal Incentive Contracts for Knowledge Workers' in: European Economic Review, 2014, 67, 82-106

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts may entail properties such...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3834
published in: Economic Inquiry, 2015, 53(1), 714-730

Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theoretical and empirical framework in the context of...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 2367
published in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2007, 163 (4), 531-551

We analyze the role of damage clauses in labor contracts using a model in which a worker may want to terminate his current employment relationship and work for another firm. We show that the initial parties to a contract have an incentive to stipulate excessive damage clauses, which leads to...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1180

We perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of transfer fee regulations on professional soccer in Europe. Based on a model on the interaction of moral hazard and heterogeneity, we show (i) how the regulations effect contract durations and wages, (ii) that contracting parties have an incentive to...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1171
revised version published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 65 (3-4), 387-408

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited examples include hospitals and...