Wendelin Schnedler graduated as Master of Science in Statistics at Iowa State University in 1995 and as Diplom-Statistiker at Dortmund University in 1998 before joining the Bonn Graduate School of Economics. He enrolled in the the European Doctorate Program in Quantitive Economics and spent a year at the microeconometric laboratory of the Centre de la Recherche en Economie et Statistique (CREST) in Paris.

From September 2000 until September 2002, he worked at IZA. He submitted his thesis on the value of information in hidden action models in Summer 2002. In October 2002, he joined the Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) at the University of Bristol before moving to the University of Trier in 2004. Since January 2005, he works at the University of Heidelberg. During spring semester 2009, he taught as a stand-in professoer at Mannheim University. Since Summer 2011, he is full professor for Managerial Economics at the University of Paderborn.

Wendelin Schnedler became an IZA Research Affiliate in 1999 and an IZA Research Fellow in March 2003. His main fields of research are personnel economics, econometrics, and contract theory. He is also interested in the psychological foundations of incentives, evolutionary game theory, and experimental economics.



IZA Discussion Paper No. 8108
published in: European Economic Review, 2014, 68, 106–115

Anecdotal, empirical, and experimental evidence suggests that offering extrinsic rewards for certain activities can reduce people's willingness to engage in those activities voluntarily. We propose a simple rationale for this 'crowding out' phenomenon, using standard economic arguments. The central idea is that the potential to earn rewards in return for...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5325
improved version is available here

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identification problem. It also describes organizations that can solve this identification...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3685
improved version is available here

How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bureaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3143
published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2011, 78 (1-2), 1-13

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to assure certain efforts...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3077
published as ' You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income and Effort ' in: German Economic Review, 2011, 12 (1), 1 - 10

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may well reduce...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3013
Wendelin Schnedler, Radovan Vadovic
published in: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2011, 20 (4), 985-1009

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control signals the expectations of the...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 2124
published as "When is it foolish to reward for A while benefiting from B" in: Journal of Labor Economics, 2008, 26 (4), 595-619

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a “good” allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager’s employer. A necessary...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1669
published in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy , 2008, 8 (1), Article 27

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We show that by dividing labour...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 849

In this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reflect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the resulting dynamics are a multivariate stochastic...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 837
published in: Econometric Reviews, 2005, 24 (2), 195-217

This article considers a wide class of censoring problems and presents a construction rule for an objective function. This objective function generalises the ordinary likelihood as well as particular “likelihoods” used for estimation in several censoring models. Under regularity conditions the maximiser of this generalised likelihood has all the properties...