Indraneel Dasgupta is currently Professor, Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, India. He was educated at Presidency College (Calcutta), Jawaharlal Nehru University (Delhi) and the University of California.

Indraneel’s research interests lie broadly in the areas of microeconomic theory, development economics and public economics, with a policy focus on issues relating to inequality and distributive conflict. His work in microeconomic theory has focused on foundational issues in revealed preference theory. His research in the areas of development economics and public economics has addressed aspects of intra-household distribution, charitable donation, group inequality, identity conflict and class antagonism. Indraneel has published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, Defence and Peace Economics, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Economic Theory, European Economic Review, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Inequality, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Globalization and Development, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Oxford Economic Papers, Public Choice and Social Choice and Welfare. His research has been supported by the US Department of Agriculture, the Pew Charitable Trusts US, and the European Union.

Indraneel has been an academic visitor to a number of institutions in the US, Europe, Asia and Australia, including Alicante, Australian National University, Carlos III, CORE, Cornell, Delhi School of Economics, Dhaka, Indian Statistical Institute, Namur, Tulane and WIDER, Helsinki. Indraneel taught at Deakin University, Australia, Nottingham University, UK, Durham University, UK, and the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, before moving to the Indian Statistical Institute in 2012. He joined IZA as a Research Fellow in January 2008.

Indraneel is currently a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Development Studies.



IZA Discussion Paper No. 10998
Indraneel Dasgupta, Ranajoy Guha Neogi

We model political contestation over school language policy, within linguistic communities where weak property rights protection leads to high decentralized expropriation. We show that improvements in governance institutions that facilitate property rights protection might exacerbate such language conflicts, even as they reduce the chances of persisting with educational indigenization, while,...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 10881
Indraneel Dasgupta, Ranajoy Guha Neogi
published in: Public Choice, 2018, 174 (3-4), 315-334.

We model a contest between two groups of equal population size over the division of a group-specific public good. Each group is fragmented into sub-groups. Each sub-group allocates effort between production and contestation. There is perfect coordination within sub-groups, but sub-groups cannot coordinate with one another. All sub-groups choose effort...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9731
Dripto Bakshi, Indraneel Dasgupta

We model simultaneous inter and within identity-group conflict in two territories connected by cross-territorial spill-overs. Within each territory, two groups contest the division of a group-specific public good, and all members contest the division of group income. Each group has a cross-border affiliate. Greater success (share) of its affiliate 'spills...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9159
Dripto Bakshi, Indraneel Dasgupta
published in: Defence and Peace Economics, 2018, 29 (2), 147-170

We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The contest yields the per-period relative influence...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8051
published in: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2015, 86 (1), 7-31

We examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to NGOs to increase community participation. We show that, when such incentives are provided, there need not exist any meaningful relationship between beneficiary welfare and the extent of community participation implemented by an NGO. Higher community participation is consistent even with...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7924
Indraneel Dasgupta, Diganta Mukherjee

We examine the consequences, of integrating large minorities into productivity-relevant majority ethno-linguistic norms, for distribution, ethnic conflict and crime. We develop a two-community model where such assimilation generates social gains by: (a) facilitating economic interaction, and (b) dampening religious or racial conflict over symbolic and normative contents of the public...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6221
published in: Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2015, 64 (1), 71-111

We develop a model of regulation of service-delivery NGOs, where future grants are conditional on prior spending of some minimal proportion of current revenue on direct project-related expenses. Such regulation induces some NGOs to increase current project spending, but imposes wasteful costs of compliance verification on all NGOs. Under a...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5767

Much of the existing literature on the use of informal credit arrangements such as ROSCAs (Rotating and Credit Saving Associations) theorises the use of such institutions as arising from market failures in the development of formal saving and credit mechanisms. As economic development proceeds, formal institutions might therefore be expected...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4818

Non-positivity of the generalized substitution effect, non-positivity of the own-price substitution effect, homogeneity of degree zero in all prices and income, and the law of demand are some of the most primitive comparative static results in the standard revealed preference theory of consumers’ behaviour. These results are however derived for...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4604
published in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2011, 167 (2), 247-265.

Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action (‘investment’). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract...