Tommaso Nannicini is full Professor of Political Economy at Bocconi University.

He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the European University Institute in 2005.

He has been Economic Adviser (2014-15) and Undersecretary of State (2016) to the Italian Prime Minister. He has also been Visiting Professor at Harvard University and Carlos III University of Madrid, and Visiting Scholar at MIT, IMF, Pompeu Fabra, and EIEF. His research interests include Political Economy, Policy Evaluation, Comparative Politics, and Labor Economics. He is Research Fellow at CEPR, IGIER, and Baffi Carefin.

He joined IZA as a Research Fellow in November 2007.

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Publications

IZA Discussion Paper No. 10551

The Italian civil war and the Nazi occupation of Italy occurred at a critical juncture, just before the birth of a new democracy and when, for the first time in a generation, Italians were choosing political affiliations and forming political identities. In this paper we study how these traumatic events...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9906

This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. We implemented a survey experiment during the (mixed gender) electoral race for mayor in Milan (2011), and a field experiment during the (same gender) electoral race for mayor in Cava de' Tirreni (2015)....

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9553
forthcoming in: American Journal of Political Science

In many countries, important features of municipal government (such as the electoral system, mayors' salaries, and the number of councillors) depend on whether the municipality is above or below arbitrary population thresholds. Several papers have used a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to measure the effects of these threshold-based policies on...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7561
published in: American Economic Review, 2016, 106 (8), 2349-70

We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7483
updated and expanded as IZA DP 'Persuasion and Gender: Experimental Evidence from Two Political Campaigns'

This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. During the 2011 municipal elections in Milan, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to the same incumbent's campaign but to different opponent's campaigns, with either...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7340
published in: American Economic Review, 2015, 105 (1), 322-353

Rational voters update their subjective beliefs about candidates' attributes with the arrival of information, and subsequently base their votes on these beliefs. Information accrual is, however, endogenous to voters' types and difficult to identify in observational studies. In a large scale randomized trial conducted during an actual mayoral campaign in...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7169
published in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2014, 6 (3), 159-188

This paper evaluates the effects of changes in the supply of news provided by newspapers on electoral participation, political selection, and government efficiency. We address these issues in the Italian context by constructing a new dataset covering the presence of local news by different types of newspapers (i.e., local and...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6952
published as 'Do Fiscal Rules Matter?' in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2016, 8 (3), 1-30

We evaluate the effect of relaxing fiscal rules on policy outcomes applying a quasi-experimental research design. In 1999, the Italian central government introduced fiscal rules aimed at imposing fiscal discipline on municipal governments, and in 2001 the rules were relaxed for municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. This institutional change allows us...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5698
published in: American Political Science Review, 2012, 106 (4), 742-761

This paper uses a quasi-experimental strategy to disclose utterly political reasons behind the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We apply a regression discontinuity design in close elections to identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. We find that municipalities where...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4706
published in: American Economic Review, 2013, 103 (5), 1759-1796

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in...

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