Jasmin Kantarevic received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Toronto in 2005. He is currently employed as a senior director, Economics, Ontario Medical Association. He also teaches Personnel Economics at the University of Toronto.

His most recent research focuses on the impact of financial and non-financial incentives on behaviour of health care providers as it relates to access, quality, and cost of health care.

He joined IZA as a Research Affiliate in January 2004 and became a Research Fellow in October 2006.



IZA Discussion Paper No. 9142
Jasmin Kantarevic, Boris Kralj

We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6474
Jasmin Kantarevic, Boris Kralj
published in: Health Economics, 2013, 22(12), 1417–1439

Pay for performance (P4P) incentives for physicians are generally designed as additional payments that can be paired with any existing payment mechanism such as salary, fee-for-service, and capitation. However, the link between the physician response to performance incentives and the existing payment mechanisms is still not well understood. In this...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5762
Jasmin Kantarevic, Boris Kralj
published in: Canadian Journal of Economics, 2013, 46 (1), 208-238

We study the impact of a mixed capitation model known as the Family Health Organization (FHO) on selected quality and quantity outcomes relative to an enhanced fee-for-service model known as the Family Health Group (FHG) among primary care physicians in Ontario, Canada. Using a panel of administrative data that covers...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4862
Jasmin Kantarevic, Boris Kralj, Darrel Weinkauf
published in: Journal of Health Economics, 2011, 30 (1), 99-111

We study an enhanced fee-for-service model for primary care physicians in the Family Health Groups (FHG) in Ontario, Canada. In contrast to the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) model, the FHG model includes targeted fee increases, extended hours, performance-based initiatives, and patient enrolment. Using a long panel of claims data, we find...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1789
published in: Journal of Human Resources, 2006, 41(4), 755-777

Whether siblings of specific birth order perform differently has been a longstanding open empirical question. We use the family tree structure of the PSID to examine two claims found in the literature: whether being early in the birth order implies a distinct educational advantage, and whether there exists, within large...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1784
Boris Kralj, Jasmin Kantarevic, Darrel Weinkauf
published in: Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'économique, 2008, 41(4), 1262-1284

Income cap or threshold systems rely on incentives that encourage physicians to limit medical expenditures, but little is known about how physicians respond to these incentives. Conceptually, the threshold system is to physicians what an income tax system is to taxpayers. We exploit this similarity to analyze the impact of...

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1142

This paper examines the relationship between interethnic marriages and economic assimilation among immigrants in the United States. Two competing hypotheses are evaluated: the productivity hypothesis, according to which immigrants married to native-born spouses assimilate faster than comparable immigrants married to foreign-born spouses because spouses play an integral role in the...