TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Cai, Xiaoming
AU  - Gautier, Pieter A.
AU  - Wolthoff, Ronald P.
        TI  - Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation
        PY  - 2016/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9950
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9950
        AB  - In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call "joint concavity." Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.
        KW  - search frictions
KW  - matching function
KW  - meeting technology
KW  - heterogeneity
KW  - competing mechanisms
        ER  -