%0 Report
        %A Cai, Xiaoming
%A Gautier, Pieter A.
%A Wolthoff, Ronald P.
        %T Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation
        %D 2016
        %8 2016 May
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 9950
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9950
        %X In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call "joint concavity." Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.
        %K search frictions
%K matching function
%K meeting technology
%K heterogeneity
%K competing mechanisms