@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp9950,
            	author={Cai, Xiaoming and Gautier, Pieter A. and Wolthoff, Ronald P.},
            	title={Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation},
            	year={2016},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={9950},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9950},
	abstract={In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call "joint concavity." Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.},
	keywords={search frictions;matching function;meeting technology;heterogeneity;competing mechanisms},
            }