TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Falco, Salvatore Di
AU  - Magdalou, Brice
AU  - Masclet, David
AU  - Villeval, Marie Claire
AU  - Willinger, Marc
        TI  - Can Transparency of Information Reduce Embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania
        PY  - 2016/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9925
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9925
        AB  - Embezzlement is a major concern in various settings. By means of a sequential modified dictator game, we investigate theoretically and experimentally whether making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement and improve the recipients' welfare. Consistent with reference-dependent preferences in terms of moral ideal, we show that the impact of transparency is conditional on the length of the transfer chain and on the position of the intermediaries in the chain. Its direct effect on image encourages honesty. Its indirect effect via expectations plays in the opposite direction, motivating individuals to embezzle more when they expect that the following intermediary will embezzle less. Senders react positively to a reduction of the length of the chain but negatively to transparency.
        KW  - embezzlement
KW  - corruption
KW  - dishonesty
KW  - transparency
KW  - experiment
        ER  -