TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Feess, Eberhard
AU  - Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
AU  - Schramm, Markus
AU  - Wohlschlegel, Ansgar
        TI  - The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Theory and Evidence from the Laboratory
        PY  - 2015/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9388
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9388
        AB  - We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given. Equilibrium effects account for the interdependency of these decisions. This interdependency is important since, in the case of legal uncertainty, higher fines may reduce the willingness to punish, which in turn reduces the deterrence effect of high fines. Using a laboratory experiment, we identify these effects empirically by means of a strategy-method design in which potential violators can condition their behavior on the behavior of potential punishers and vice versa. All our experimental findings on both partial and equilibrium effects are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theory.
        KW  - deterrence
KW  - punishment
KW  - legal uncertainty
KW  - fines
KW  - laboratory experiment
KW  - partial and equilibrium effects
        ER  -