TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Dutcher, E. Glenn
AU  - Balafoutas, Loukas
AU  - Lindner, Florian
AU  - Ryvkin, Dmitry
AU  - Sutter, Matthias
        TI  - Strive to be First or Avoid Being Last: An Experiment on Relative Performance Incentives
        PY  - 2015/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9330
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9330
        AB  - We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger groups. Avoiding being last produces the lowest variance of effort and is more effective at motivating employees compared to competing for the top.
        KW  - experiment
KW  - contract
KW  - loser
KW  - winner
KW  - tournament
KW  - learning
        ER  -