TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Burdin, Gabriel
AU  - Halliday, Simon
AU  - Landini, Fabio
        TI  - Third-Party vs. Second-Party Control: Disentangling the Role of Autonomy and Reciprocity
        PY  - 2015/Aug/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9251
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9251
        AB  - This paper studies the role of autonomy and reciprocity in explaining control averse responses in principal-agents interactions. While most of the social psychology literature emphasizes the role of autonomy, recent economic research has provided an alternative explanation based on reciprocity. We propose a simple model and an experiment to test the relative strength of these two motives. We compare two treatments: one in which control is exerted directly by the principal (second-party control); and the other in which it is exerted by a third party enjoying no residual claimancy rights (third-party control). If control aversion is driven mainly by autonomy, then it should persist in the third-party treatment. Our results, however, suggest that this is not the case. Moreover, when a third party instead of the principal exerts control, control results in a greater expected profit for the principal. The implications of these results for organizational design are discussed.
        KW  - social preferences
KW  - principal-agent game
KW  - autonomy
KW  - control aversion
KW  - second party
KW  - third party
KW  - trust
KW  - reciprocity
        ER  -