TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Kantarevic, Jasmin
AU  - Kralj, Boris
        TI  - Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and its Application to Ontario
        PY  - 2015/Jun/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9142
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9142
        AB  - We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee-for-service contract and a blended capitation contract; (2) the capitation rate is higher and the cost-reimbursement rate is lower in the blended capitation contract; (3) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (4) physicians in the blended capitation model provide fewer services than physicians in the enhanced fee-for-service model.
        KW  - adverse selection
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - physician remuneration
KW  - Ontario
        ER  -