@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp9142,
            	author={Kantarevic, Jasmin and Kralj, Boris},
            	title={Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and its Application to Ontario},
            	year={2015},
	month={Jun},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={9142},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9142},
	abstract={We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee-for-service contract and a blended capitation contract; (2) the capitation rate is higher and the cost-reimbursement rate is lower in the blended capitation contract; (3) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (4) physicians in the blended capitation model provide fewer services than physicians in the enhanced fee-for-service model.},
	keywords={adverse selection;moral hazard;physician remuneration;Ontario},
            }