@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp9056,
            	author={Gavrel, Frédéric and Rebiere, Therese},
            	title={On the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of 'Keeping up with the Joneses'},
            	year={2015},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={9056},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9056},
	abstract={This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to keep up with the Joneses. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Joneses, including the Joneses themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale in this equilibrium. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Unexpectedly, numerical simulations show that this theory could account for the observed distribution of intermediate wages.},
	keywords={Keeping up with the Joneses;social interactions;well-being;inequalities;efficiency},
            }