TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Fehrler, Sebastian
AU  - Hughes, Niall
        TI  - How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment
        PY  - 2015/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9027
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp9027
        AB  - We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently, and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out – transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.
        KW  - committee decision-making
KW  - deliberation
KW  - transparency
KW  - career concerns
KW  - information aggregation
KW  - experiments
KW  - voting
KW  - strategic communication
        ER  -