%0 Report
        %A Irlenbusch, Bernd
%A Sliwka, Dirk
        %T Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior
        %D 2003
        %8 2003 Oct
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 887
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp887
        %X The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple
repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by
choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals’ payoffs are determined by a
random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more
transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no
significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger
diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very
large effort levels increases.
        %K inequity aversion
%K gift exchange
%K reputation
%K reciprocity
%K transparency