@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp8702,
            	author={Centeno, Mario and Novo, Alvaro A.},
            	title={Paying for Others' Protection: Causal Evidence on Wages in a Two-Tier System},
            	year={2014},
	month={Dec},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={8702},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp8702},
	abstract={In a segmented labor market, theory predicts that employment protection has an asymmetric impact on entry and incumbent wages. We explore a reform that increased the protection of open-ended contracts for a well-defined subset of firms, while leaving it unchanged for other firms. The causal evidence points to a reduction in wages for new open-ended and fixed-term contracts and no impact for more tenured workers. The reductions estimated for entrants oscillate between -0.9 and -0.5 p.p., covering a significant part of the expected increase in firing costs. Firms with larger shares of fixed-term contracts shifted the burden to these workers.},
	keywords={wages;two-tier systems;quasi-experiment;employment protection},
            }