TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Ven, Jeroen van de
AU  - Villeval, Marie Claire
        TI  - Dishonesty under Scrutiny
        PY  - 2014/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 8638
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp8638
        AB  - We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender's identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender's lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.
        KW  - deception
KW  - lies
KW  - dishonesty
KW  - social image
KW  - experiment
        ER  -