TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Irlenbusch, Bernd
AU  - Sliwka, Dirk
        TI  - Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market
        PY  - 2003/Aug/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 855
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp855
        AB  - We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström’s career concerns model in
which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by
agents’ unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers
firms are informed about first-period profits. In a different treatment firms additionally learn
the abilities of agents. Theory suggests high first-period equilibrium effort in the hidden ability
treatment but no effort elsewhere. However, we find that effort is significantly higher in the
revealed ability treatment and therefore conclude that transparency does not weaken, but
strengthen career concerns incentives.
        KW  - career concerns
KW  - reciprocity
KW  - reputation
KW  - labour market
KW  - incentives
        ER  -