TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Cherchye, Laurens
AU  - Demuynck, Thomas
AU  - Rock, Bram De
AU  - Vermeulen, Frederic
        TI  - Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable
        PY  - 2014/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 8070
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp8070
        AB  - We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show that this revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even if there is only a single consumption observation per household and individual preferences are heterogeneous across households. In addition, the characterization allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure (including the sharing rule) under the same minimalistic assumptions. An application to Dutch household data demonstrates the empirical usefulness of our theoretical results.
        KW  - testable implications
KW  - Pareto efficient household consumption
KW  - stable matching
KW  - marriage market
KW  - sharing rule identification
KW  - preference heterogeneity
        ER  -