TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bartos, Vojtech
AU  - Bauer, Michal
AU  - Chytilová, Julie
AU  - Matejka, Filip
        TI  - Attention Discrimination: Theory and Field Experiments with Monitoring Information Acquisition
        PY  - 2014/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 8058
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp8058
        AB  - We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. Our model of allocation of costly attention implies that applicants from negatively stereotyped groups face "attention discrimination": less attention in highly selective cherry-picking markets, where more attention helps applicants, and more attention in lemon-dropping markets, where it harms them. To test the prediction, we integrate tools to monitor information acquisition into correspondence field experiments.
In both countries we study we find that unfavorable signals, minority names, or unemployment, systematically reduce employers' efforts to inspect resumes. Also consistent with the model, in the rental housing market, which is much less selective than labor markets, we find landlords acquire more information about minority relative to majority applicants. We discuss implications of endogenous attention for magnitude and persistence of discrimination in selection decisions, returns to human capital and, potentially, for policy.
        KW  - monitoring information acquisition
KW  - discrimination
KW  - attention
KW  - field experiment
        ER  -