TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Dobbelaere, Sabien
AU  - Luttens, Roland Iwan
        TI  - The Economics of First-Contract Mediation
        PY  - 2013/Jul/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 7541
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp7541
        AB  - This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
        KW  - BC first-contract model
KW  - mediation
KW  - collective bargaining
KW  - union
KW  - non-binding contract
        ER  -