%0 Report
        %A Kräkel, Matthias
        %T Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams
        %D 1999
        %8 1999 Nov
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 74
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp74
        %X This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser’s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.
        %K teams
%K Economies of scope
%K tournament
%K free-rider effect
%K mismatch