@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp7163,
            	author={Lester, Benjamin R. and Visschers, Ludo and Wolthoff, Ronald P.},
            	title={Competing with Asking Prices},
            	year={2013},
	month={Jan},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={7163},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp7163},
	abstract={In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real world markets, asking prices have received little attention in the academic literature. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal: it is the pricing mechanism that maximizes sellers' revenues and it implements the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it to explore the positive implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.},
	keywords={competing mechanism design;asking prices;auctions with entry;competitive search},
            }