TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Pfeifer, Christian
        TI  - Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company
        PY  - 2012/Dec/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 7088
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp7088
        AB  - Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.
        KW  - wages
KW  - insider econometrics
KW  - absenteeism
KW  - bonus
KW  - effort
KW  - incentives
        ER  -