TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bigoni, Maria
AU  - Camera, Gabriele
AU  - Casari, Marco
        TI  - Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers
        PY  - 2012/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 7051
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp7051
        AB  - We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.
        KW  - artefactual field experiment
KW  - peer punishment
KW  - prisoner's dilemma
KW  - non-standard subject pools
KW  - stranger matching
        ER  -