%0 Report
        %A Giertz, Seth H.
%A Tosun, Mehmet S.
        %T Migration Elasticities, Fiscal Federalism and the Ability of States to Redistribute Income
        %D 2012
        %8 2012 Aug
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 6798
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp6798
        %X This paper develops a simulation model in order to examine the effectiveness of state attempts at redistribution under a variety of migration elasticity assumptions. Key outputs from the simulation include the impact of tax-induced migration on state revenues, excess burden, and fiscal externalities. With modest migration elasticities, the costs of state-level redistribution are substantial, but state action may still be preferred to a federal policy that is at odds with preferences of a state's citizens. At higher migration elasticities, the costs of state action can be tremendous. Overall excess burden is greater, but this is dominated by horizontal fiscal externalities. Horizontal fiscal externalities represent a cost to the state pursuing additional redistribution, but not a cost at the national level.
        %K excess burden
%K income redistribution
%K fiscal federalism
%K fiscal externalities
%K deadweight loss