@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp6798,
            	author={Giertz, Seth H. and Tosun, Mehmet S.},
            	title={Migration Elasticities, Fiscal Federalism and the Ability of States to Redistribute Income},
            	year={2012},
	month={Aug},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={6798},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp6798},
	abstract={This paper develops a simulation model in order to examine the effectiveness of state attempts at redistribution under a variety of migration elasticity assumptions. Key outputs from the simulation include the impact of tax-induced migration on state revenues, excess burden, and fiscal externalities. With modest migration elasticities, the costs of state-level redistribution are substantial, but state action may still be preferred to a federal policy that is at odds with preferences of a state's citizens. At higher migration elasticities, the costs of state action can be tremendous. Overall excess burden is greater, but this is dominated by horizontal fiscal externalities. Horizontal fiscal externalities represent a cost to the state pursuing additional redistribution, but not a cost at the national level.},
	keywords={excess burden;income redistribution;fiscal federalism;fiscal externalities;deadweight loss},
            }