TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Markussen, Thomas
AU  - Reuben, Ernesto
AU  - Tyran, Jean-Robert
        TI  - Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
        PY  - 2012/Jun/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 6620
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp6620
        AB  - The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
        KW  - tournament
KW  - public goods
KW  - competition
KW  - cooperation
KW  - voting
        ER  -