TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Croix, David de la
AU  - Mariani, Fabio
        TI  - From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions
        PY  - 2012/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 6599
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp6599
        AB  - Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy. 
        KW  - political economy
KW  - marriage
KW  - polygyny
KW  - monogamy
KW  - divorce
KW  - human capital
        ER  -