%0 Report
        %A Croix, David de la
%A Mariani, Fabio
        %T From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions
        %D 2012
        %8 2012 May
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 6599
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp6599
        %X Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy. 
        %K political economy
%K marriage
%K polygyny
%K monogamy
%K divorce
%K human capital