@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp6599,
            	author={Croix, David de la and Mariani, Fabio},
            	title={From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions},
            	year={2012},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={6599},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp6599},
	abstract={Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy. },
	keywords={political economy;marriage;polygyny;monogamy;divorce;human capital},
            }