TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Gerdes, Christer
AU  - Gränsmark, Patrik
AU  - Rosholm, Michael
        TI  - Chicken or Checkin'?  Rational Learning in Repeated Chess Games
        PY  - 2011/Jul/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5862
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5862
        AB  - We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.
        KW  - risk aversion
KW  - rational learning
KW  - beliefs
        ER  -