TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Ben-Yashar, Ruth
AU  - Danziger, Leif
        TI  - Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees
        PY  - 2011/Jun/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5782
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5782
        AB  - This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet, a symmetric composition of committees is not always optimal. In other words, decision makers with different skill levels should not generally be evenly divided among the committees. However, in the special case of only two skill levels, it is optimal to compose the committees evenly.
        KW  - collective decision making
KW  - committees
KW  - simple majority rule
        ER  -