TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Cigno, Alessandro
        TI  - How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
        PY  - 2011/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5663
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5663
        AB  - As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
        KW  - optimal taxation
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - uncertainty
KW  - education
KW  - child labour
        ER  -