@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp5660,
            	author={Tonin, Mirco},
            	title={Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence},
            	year={2011},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={5660},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5660},
	abstract={This paper examines the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labor. I develop a model in which firms and workers may agree to report less than the true amount of earnings to the fiscal authorities. I show that introducing a minimum wage creates a spike in the distribution of declared earnings and induces higher compliance by some agents, thus reducing their disposable income. The comparison of food consumption and of the consumption-income gap before and after the massive minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001 reveals that households who appeared to benefit from the hike actually experienced a drop compared to similar but unaffected households, thus supporting the prediction of the theory.},
	keywords={minimum wage;Hungary;tax evasion;spike},
            }