@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp5543,
            	author={Berger, Johannes and Herbertz, Claus and Sliwka, Dirk},
            	title={Managerial Incentives and Favoritism in Promotion Decisions: Theory and Field Evidence},
            	year={2011},
	month={Mar},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={5543},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5543},
	abstract={This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for managers who decide upon promotion. Second, we analyze matched employer-employee survey data with detailed firm level information on managerial incentive schemes and find that perceived promotion quality is indeed substantially higher when managers receive performance-related pay or participate in gain sharing plans.},
	keywords={incentives;favoritism;nepotism;tournaments},
            }