%0 Report
        %A Dobbelaere, Sabien
%A Luttens, Roland Iwan
        %T Collective Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
        %D 2011
        %8 2011 Feb
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 5518
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5518
        %X We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
        %K collective bargaining
%K union
%K firm
%K bargaining power
%K non-binding contract