@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp5518,
            	author={Dobbelaere, Sabien and Luttens, Roland Iwan},
            	title={Collective Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts},
            	year={2011},
	month={Feb},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={5518},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5518},
	abstract={We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.},
	keywords={collective bargaining;union;firm;bargaining power;non-binding contract},
            }