@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp5335,
            	author={Leonardi, Marco and Pica, Giovanni},
            	title={Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation},
            	year={2010},
	month={Nov},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={5335},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5335},
	abstract={Theory predicts that the wage effects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers' and firms' relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers' individual wages in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for firms below 15 employees and left firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Accounting for the endogeneity of the treatment status, we find that high-bargaining power workers (stayers, white collar and workers above 45) are almost left unaffected by the increase in EPL, while low-bargaining power workers (movers, blue collar and young workers) suffer a drop both in the wage level and its growth rate.},
	keywords={endogeneity of treatment status;policy evaluation;severance payments;costs of unjust dismissals},
            }