TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
AU  - Kariv, Shachar
AU  - Schotter, Andrew
        TI  - Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments
        PY  - 2010/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5307
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5307
        AB  - Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when individuals can only monitor and punish the other individuals to whom they are connected by the network. We study several non-trivial network architectures that give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes.
        KW  - punishment
KW  - monitoring
KW  - public good
KW  - networks
KW  - experiment
        ER  -