TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Huck, Steffen
AU  - Kübler, Dorothea
AU  - Weibull, Jörgen W.
        TI  - Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms
        PY  - 2010/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5264
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5264
        AB  - This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the incentive scheme. We also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort.
        KW  - incentives
KW  - social norms
KW  - contracts
        ER  -