%0 Report
        %A Huck, Steffen
%A Kübler, Dorothea
%A Weibull, Jörgen W.
        %T Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms
        %D 2010
        %8 2010 Oct
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 5264
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5264
        %X This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the incentive scheme. We also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort.
        %K incentives
%K social norms
%K contracts