@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp5264,
            	author={Huck, Steffen and Kübler, Dorothea and Weibull, Jörgen W.},
            	title={Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms},
            	year={2010},
	month={Oct},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={5264},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp5264},
	abstract={This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the incentive scheme. We also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort.},
	keywords={incentives;social norms;contracts},
            }