%0 Report
        %A McAusland, Carol
%A Kuhn, Peter J.
        %T Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers
        %D 2010
        %8 2010 May
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4936
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4936
        %X We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.
        %K international labor migration
%K brain drain
%K development
%K intellectual property rights