TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Dreher, Axel
AU  - Klasen, Stephan
AU  - Vreeland, James Raymond
AU  - Werker, Eric
        TI  - The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
        PY  - 2010/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4820
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4820
        AB  - As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.
        KW  - United Nations Security Council
KW  - political influence
KW  - aid effectiveness
KW  - World Bank
        ER  -